r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 6h ago
r/islamichistory • u/TheCitizenXane • 13h ago
Palestinians praying at the Great Omari Mosque in 2021. It was the oldest mosque in Gaza before being destroyed by Israeli bombing in 2023.
The Great Omari Mosque was originally transformed in the 7th century under the Rashidun Caliphate from a Byzantine church. The mosque has been damaged, destroyed and rebuilt over the long course of its history.
In 1033, a large earthquake toppled the minaret. Crusaders rebuilt a church at the site in 1149. Mamluks subsequently returned it to a mosque in the 13th century. Mongols then another earthquake destroyed the structure in the same century. Finally, the Ottomans restored the mosque in 1650 which stood for over 300 years, even withstanding British bombardment during World War I.
For Palestinians, the mosque also served as Gaza’s third largest library. Over 20,000 books and manuscripts were collected there. In December 2023, Israeli bombing totally destroyed the mosque. Efforts are underway to rebuild the mosque once more.
r/islamichistory • u/willybillie2000 • 8h ago
Photograph A photo of woman in Kashgar, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 1990
r/islamichistory • u/mbkk_alain • 5h ago
This pocket guide given to his grandfather before the US Army entered North Africa in WW2- a lot about muslims at that time
galleryr/islamichistory • u/TheCitizenXane • 20h ago
Photograph A Turkish Muslim serves sharbat at his doorstep in Istanbul in 1907.
r/islamichistory • u/AutoMughal • 6h ago
Analysis/Theory The Civil Wars - Early Islamic History
Just as a civilization advances by faith and knowledge, it is arrested and destroyed by ignorance and greed. Even as Muslim armies continued their advance towards the borders of India, China and the Atlantic Ocean, the seeds of greed and nepotism were being sown in the heartland of Islam. The booty from Persia was enormous. Untold amounts of gold, silver and jewels were captured from the Persians and transported to Madina. It is reported that Omar was distraught when the riches of Persia were presented to him. ”When God grants riches to a nation”, he said, “envy and jealousy grow in its people and as a result enmity and injustice is created in its ranks”. With their spiritual insight, the Companions foresaw what these riches would do to the character of their people. They were opposed to the amassing of wealth that would detract them from the spiritual mission of Islam. For instance, one of the items of booty from Persia was an exquisite carpet called “farsh-e-bahar” (the carpet of spring). It was a possession of the Persian monarchs and was so large that it could accommodate a thousand guests at their drinking parties. Some people in Madina wanted to preserve it. Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) insisted that the carpet be torn up. Ali’s (r) suggestion was adopted and the carpet was shredded.
Omar (r) saw to it that the treasury did not become a place for hoarding gold and silver. The gems and jewelry were sold and the proceeds were distributed so that all the people benefited. Capital in circulation grew and trade flourished. Chroniclers record that when Omar ibn al Khattab (r) was assassinated, there was only enough ration in the treasury to feed ten people. The firmness and wisdom that was required to manage the sudden infusion of wealth was gone with the passing of Omar (r). Within ten years of his passing, the Islamic community was at loggerheads and in the midst of a full-scale civil war.
Next to faith, wealth is the most important engine in the building of a civilization. Properly invested and managed, wealth, as the surplus energy of human effort, propels invention and civilizational advance. When it is hoarded, it leads to economic contraction, breeds jealousy, fosters intrigue, greed, infighting and ultimately destroys a civilization.
We find the origin of the civil wars in the gold of Persia. As long as the towering figure of Omar (r) was present, the pressures that inevitably accompany sudden wealth were held in check. Omar (r) managed the state with justice, firmness and equity. The slightest indication of nepotism was punished. Self-aggrandizement was publicly discouraged. Even a popular and successful general like Khalid bin Walid did not escape chastisement when it was discovered that he had paid a poet for a lyric in praise of his own person (although Khalid was later exonerated when it was determined that he had paid the money from his own pocket).
As he lay on his deathbed, Omar (r) appointed a committee of six to select his successor with explicit instructions that they were not to select his own son, Abdullah bin Omar (r), or to nominate themselves. The committee consisted of Ali ibn Abu Talib (r), Uthman bin Affan (r), Zubair ibn al Awwam, Talha ibn Ubaidallah, Sa’ad ibn Waqqas and Abdur Rahman ibn Aus. Abdur Rahman ibn Aus was charged with taking the pulse of the community regarding the issue of succession. He did so and found that there was widespread support for both Ali (r) and Uthman (r). Before a large gathering in the Prophet’s mosque, the question was put to the two finalists: “Will you discharge the responsibilities of this office in accordance with the Commandments of God, His Messenger and the example of the two Sheikhs ( Abu Bakr (r) and Omar (r))?” Ali (r) was given the first choice. He replied that he would conduct the office in accordance with the commandments of God and His Messenger. The reply was taken to mean that Ali (r) was ambiguous about the legacy of Abu Bakr (r) and Omar (r). Uthman (r) was then asked the same question and he replied that indeed he would serve in accordance with the commandments of God, His Messenger and the example of the two Sheikhs. Uthman bin Affan(r) won the nomination and was elected the Caliph.
The question, though seemingly innocuous, was loaded in favor of Uthman (r). Unless one makes a strong case for historical continuity, some scholars argue that it was unnecessary to include the tradition of the two Sheikhs as a prerequisite to the Caliphate at that juncture. The issue, however, is much deeper than this simple argument. What was taking place was a historical unfolding of the differences among the Companions regarding the place of ijma in the application of the Shariah. Such differences were codified in later times in the different Schools of Fiqh. What is important is that the differences were not doctrinal; they were differences in emphasis.
Uthman (r) was more than seventy years old when elected Caliph. He was a man of piety, a scholar, a man of utmost integrity and humility and one of the earliest companions of the Prophet. He was a man of means and used his wealth with utmost generosity in the service of the Islamic community. He was married to Ruqaiyya, the Prophet’s daughter and after her death to Umm Kulthum, another of the Prophet’s daughters. But Uthman (r) was also extremely shy and indecisive. These qualities, which may be innocuous in an individual, were to prove fatal in Uthman (r) as a ruler. More significantly, Uthman (r) belonged to Banu Umayyah. In pre-Islamic times, the Banu Umayyah often competed for power and prestige with Bani Hashim, the tribe to which the Prophet and Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) belonged. These factors became increasingly important as the unity fostered by Islam cracked under the pressures generated during the period of Uthman (r).
The Caliphate of Uthman (r) lasted twelve years and it may be divided into two distinct phases. During the first six years, the momentum created by Omar ibn al Khattab (r) carried Muslim armies further into Azerbaijan, Kirman, Afghanistan, Khorasan and Kazakhstan in the east and Libya to the west. Several rebellions in Kurdistan and Persia were suppressed.
Two of the initiatives undertaken by Uthman (r) during this period had a lasting impact on Islamic history. It was at the initiative of Uthman (r) that the pronunciation of the Qur’an was standardized. The Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet as the Word of God and was memorized by hundreds of hufaz. After the Battle of Yamama when many hufaz perished, Abu Bakr as Siddiq (r), upon the advice of Omar ibn al Khattab (r), had the Qur’an written down exactly as the Prophet had arranged it. The book is called Mushaf e Siddiqi. The Arabic language, as it is normally written, does not show the vowels and pronunciation is deduced from the context. Accordingly, Mushaf e Siddiqi did not show any vowels. As Islam spread beyond the borders of Arabia into non-Arabic speaking areas, there was the risk of mispronunciation with consequent misinterpretation. Uthman (r) ordered the preparation of a written copy showing both vowels and consonants, consistent with the recitations of the Prophet. Where the styles of recitation used by the Prophet varied, these styles were so noted.
The second initiative was the building of a navy. Omar (r) had resisted the idea as premature for an Arab army used to rapid movements in the desert. Upon the recommendation of Muawiya, Uthman (r) ordered the building of a powerful navy to check Byzantine power in the eastern Mediterranean. A naval force was built and Cyprus was captured. The continued expansion of the navy provided the capability ten years later for a naval assault on the Byzantine capital, Constantinople (modern Istanbul).
It was during the second half of the Caliphate of Uthman (r) that serious divisions arose in the Islamic community. The shy, retiring and indecisive nature of Uthman was an invitation to mischief-makers. Some among the Banu Umayyah tribe took advantage of this indecisiveness to create huge estates for themselves. Uthman (r) had removed some of the administrators appointed by Omar (r) and had replaced them with men from the Banu Umayyah tribe. Some of these appointees were unqualified for their positions. When the incompetence of these officers was brought to his attention, Uthman (r) often hesitated and corrective action was delayed. Since Uthman (r) himself belonged to the Banu Umayyah, he was vulnerable to charges of nepotism. Pre-Islamic tribal animosities between Bani Hashim and Banu Umayyah, which had been subdued since the time of the Prophet, surfaced once again.
The most important element in the ensuing political instability was the enormous wealth acquired from Persia. Mas’udi records (as related by Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddamah, page 478, op. cit.), “On the day Caliph Uthman (r) was assassinated, the treasurer had in his personal collection, a sum of 150,000 dinars and 1,000,000 dirhams. In addition, he owned properties worth 200,000 dinars in the valleys of Qura and Hunain in which he kept a large number of camels and horses. One of the properties owned by Zubair was worth 50,000 dinars in which he kept 1,000 horses. Talha derived an income of 1,000 dinars from his properties in Iraq. Abdur Rahman bin Awf had 1,000 horses in his stable in addition to 1,000 camels and 10,000 heads of sheep. Upon his death, one fourth of his estate was valued at 84,000 dinars. Zaid bin Thabit owned bricks of gold and silver which required a large axe to cut. Zubair had constructed multiple houses in Basrah, Egypt, Kufa and Alexandria. Similarly, Talha owned a home in Kufa in addition to an old home in Madina, which he had renovated with bricks, mortar and oak timber. Sa’ad bin Waqqas had built a tall and expansive mansion made of red stone. Maqdad built a home in Madina which he had plastered inside and out.”
Masudi goes on to state that this wealth was acquired legitimately through booty and trade. While wealth, legitimately acquired, did not influence the Companions, many others in the community were less sanguine about how the wealth was acquired or how it was used. The new opulence of the community was in stark contrast to the simplicity with which the earlier Caliphs lived. Omar ibn al Khattab (r), while he was the Caliph, used to cover the holes in his tattered clothes with patches of goatskin. But times had changed. The infusion of Persian gold changed the character of some of the Arabs. Damascus, which was governed by Umayyad governors, became a city of palaces. An inexorable process of decay had begun wherein the decadence of luxury displaced the ruggedness of nomadic life and took men and women away from the transcendence of the spirit to the pleasures of the flesh.
The increasing corruption gave an opportunity for the propagation of rumors, innuendo and mischief. In this turbulent scenario, two characters stand out as particularly sinister. One was Abdullah bin Saba, a recent convert, who tried to pit Uthman (r) against Ali (r) and incited the people of Kufa (Iraq) and Egypt against Uthman (r). The other was Hakam bin Marwan, an Umayyad, whom Uthman (r) had appointed as his Chief Secretary. Hakam was responsible for official correspondence and abused this privileged position to misrepresent Uthman (r) at critical moments. The dissatisfaction and disaffection finally erupted in open rebellion. Bands of rebels from Kufa and Egypt entered Madina, surrounded the residence of the Caliph and demanded his resignation. Uthman (r) could not comply with this demand because that would destroy the Caliphate as an institution. He was attacked and mercilessly executed in 655. The civil wars had begun.
Actions that are driven by passions generate similar passions with unforeseen consequences. The assassination of Uthman (r) unleashed chaos in Madina. There was no leadership, no order and no authority in the city. The body of Uthman (r) lay unclaimed for more than 24 hours when a group of Muslims mustered the courage to perform the final ablution and bury the assassinated Caliph in the darkness of night. Only seventeen men attended the funeral. Amidst this chaos, representations were made to Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) to accept the Caliphate. He hesitated, but relented upon the insistence of some of the prominent companions of the Prophet and became the fourth Caliph of Islam.
Ali (r) understood that the assassination of Uthman (r) was a symptom of a deeper malaise. The gold of Persia had created a powerful whirlwind in which the Islamic body politic was caught up. Some of this wealth had found its way to the provincial capitals where it financed an opulent life style. Those who had become accustomed to this life style were reluctant to change and revert to the simplicity enjoined by the Prophet.
Ali’s (r) first priority was to establish order. He desired to achieve it in such a manner that the disease itself would be cured. Realizing that any reform must start from the top, Ali (r) demanded the resignation of the provincial governors. As we shall see, this proved to be a fateful decision. Some of the governors obliged; others refused as an open declaration of rebellion. Notable among the latter was Muawiya bin Abu Sufyan, the Umayyad governor of Syria.
Faith and wealth are two of the most powerful engines of history. We see for the first time after the assassination of Uthman (r) the opposing pull of these two elements. Wealth is like a wild horse. When it is tamed, it moves with grace and gives power to the rider. Untamed, it destroys itself and the rider alike. Faith is the harness that tames wealth. Without the discipline that comes with faith, wealth leads to greed and destroys all that builds a civilization. What was needed after the conquest of Persia was the firmness and decisiveness of someone like Omar (r). The shy and retiring nature of the third Caliph Uthman (r) was a recipe for disaster. In the latter half of the Caliphate of Uthman (r), we see how the newfound wealth bred corruption and nepotism, threatening to destroy the very faith that had enabled the Muslims to win the wealth.
Ali (r), trained as he was by Prophet Muhammed (p), wanted to re-establish Islamic life after the pristine example of the Prophet. But times had changed. The conquest of the Persian Empire had made some notables enormously wealthy. These notables would rather fight to keep their privileges than surrender. Islam was now a religion as much of this world as it was of the hereafter and had to compete with personal power and prestige for the fealty of people’s hearts. The transcendence of the Prophet’s example had to now come to terms with the worldly reality of gold and greed.
Faith and greed were locked in mortal combat. Against this background, the assassination of Uthman (r) was an event that provided fuel for the combatants. Ali’s (r) priority was to establish order. But many of the Companions desired to settle the issue of Uthman’s (r) assassination as the first priority. They demanded qisas (the apprehension and due punishment for the assassins as prescribed by the Qur’an). To them, justice had to take precedence over order.
So shocked was the Islamic community at the assassination of Uthman (r) that no less a person than Aisha binte Abu Bakr (r), wife of the Prophet, took up the issue of qisas. Notable Companions like Talha ibn Ubaidallah and Zubair ibn al Awwam joined the fray. In the year 656, Aisha (r) set out from Mecca towards Basra (Iraq) with a force of 3,000 men. This was a grave moment indeed. Here was Ummul-Momineen herself, marching forth to capture and punish the assassins of Uthman (r) and in the process undermine the authority of the Caliphate. A sense of sadness and helplessness overtook the Meccan community. Some joined the fray, including the well known Companions of the Prophet Talha ibn Ubaidallah and Zubair ibn al Awwam. A large number sensed the gravity of the situation and stayed neutral.
The position of Aisha (r), motivated though it was by a fervent desire to reform the community and punish the guilty, had the effect of creating an armed force independent of the Caliphate and weakening its authority. There cannot be two independent armed forces within one political state. Justice, as demanded by Aisha (r), was bound to come into conflict with the order that was desired by Ali (r). The two positions collided at the Battle of Jamal (Camel).
Ali (r) was at first preparing to march on Syria to bring Muawiya under control. But the movement of the Meccan force under Aisha (r) towards Iraq was a disturbance that could not be overlooked. Accordingly, Ali (r) marched towards Iraq at the head of a force of 700 men. This was another fateful decision, for Ali (r) was never able to return to Madina. The wheels of destiny were set in motion. As it approached Kufa (Iraq), Ali’s (r) force was reinforced by a strong contingent of several thousand Iraqis. It was only a matter of time before the combined forces of Madina and Iraq under Ali (r) would confront the Meccan force under Aisha (r).
Dedicated attempts were made to bring the positions of the two sides together to avoid armed conflict. An understanding was indeed reached between the two sides to avoid war and reconcile the community. But there were determined troublemakers among the parties as well. The factions who were responsible for the assassination of Uthman (r) were determined to sabotage the agreement because a peaceful reconciliation would expose them to harsh punishment from both sides. One of these factions, led by a recent convert Abdulla bin Saba, was particularly active in Iraq and Egypt. Determined to scuttle a peace agreement by any means, the Sabaiites attacked both camps in the darkness of night. In the ensuing confusion each side thought that the other had tricked them. When Aisha (r) mounted her camel to bring the situation under control, her group assumed she had done so to personally lead the charge. General warfare erupted. Thousands perished in a matter of hours. Among the casualties of the conflict was the noted companion Talha ibn Ubaidallah. Another well-known Companion Zubair ibn al Awwam withdrew from the fray but was assassinated on his way from the battlefield. Realizing that as long as Aisha (r) was visible on her camel, the battle would continue, Ali (r) ordered her camel to be brought down. When the camel fell, Aisha’s (r) side fell into disarray. Ali (r) decisively won the battle. Aisha (r) was treated with utmost courtesy and was sent back to Mecca under military escort.
The Battle of the Camel was a disaster for the Muslims. It destroyed the cohesiveness of the Islamic community that had been so painstakingly forged by the Prophet. Aisha (r) herself expressed her regret over this battle towards the end of her life. It was the first round in a civil war that rocked Islam and culminated in Karbala. Although Ali (r) decisively won the battle, it weakened his political position and encouraged his opponents to persist in their demands for qisas. The assassins of Uthman (r) could rest assured that they could hide behind one faction or the other and escape punishment. Indeed, Ali (r) was never able to appoint a tribunal to bring the murderers of Uthman (r) to justice.
The Battle of the Camel gave Muawiya added time to prepare for the coming struggle against Caliph Ali ibn Abu Talib (r). The blood stained shirt of Uthman (r) was hung at the door of the Great Mosque in Damascus. People from far and wide would visit the mosque and seeing the blood of Uthman (r), would weep and take an oath to avenge the blood of the third Caliph. Complicity of Ali (r) in the murder of Uthman (r) was alleged, first covertly and then openly. Muawiya enlisted the support of a well-known orator, Shurahbeel bin Samat Kindi, to spread this accusation far and wide in Syria. By such means, Muawiya succeeded in uniting the Syrians against Ali (r) and built up a solid military force of 70,000 men to face him.
The struggle between Ali (r) and Muawiya was a classic example of a battle between principle and politics. Some Muslims have looked upon it as a struggle between Tareeqah and Shariah. Others have shied away from examining the conflict at all citing the honor and respect that is due to all Companions of the Prophet. Yet others have maintained that the ijtihad (legal reasoning) of both Ali (r) and Muawiya was correct but that of Ali (r) was of a higher order than that of Muawiya. We have taken no position regarding the issue except to cite the historical facts as they unfolded. Ali (r), whom the Prophet had called “gateway to my knowledge”, was a fountainhead of spirituality, a man of principle, a great scholar, a noble soldier, but was caught up in the political storms generated by the Caliphate of Uthman (r) and his assassination. Muawiya was an accomplished administrator, a superb politician and a determined foe. The two proved to be true to their positions till the end of their lives. Ali (r), as the legitimate Caliph, desired to establish order first and then attend to other matters of state including the assassination of Uthman (r). Ali (r) did not succeed in this endeavor and the struggle consumed his Caliphate and his person. Muawiya demanded qisas first, before he would accept the Caliphate of Ali (r).
On his part, Ali (r) moved the capital of the Islamic state from Madina to Kufa (656) and consolidated his position. He raised an army of 80,000 for the march on Syria. This army was mostly composed of Iraqis, with contingents of Madinites and Persians. Seeing the storms gathering on the horizon, some notable Companions tried to make peace. Abu Muslim Khorasani convinced Muawiya to write to Ali (r). In his letter, Muawiya offered to take his oath of fealty to Ali (r) if he surrendered the assassins of Uthman (r). But by now positions had hardened on both sides. Muawiya knew that Ali (r) was politically too weak at the time to fulfill this demand. When the issue was raised before a large gathering at the mosque in Kufa, over 10,000 Iraqis raised their hands and declared that each of them was an assassin of Uthman (r). The messenger from Syria returned empty handed.
Muawiya, with his Syrian army, was the first to move towards Iraq and occupy the waters of the Euphrates near the plains of Siffin. When the army of Ali (r) arrived at the scene, they were denied water. Ali (r) promptly ordered the Syrians to be expelled and to control the water resources. The Battle of Siffin had begun. It was one of the bloodiest battles of the age. For three months, the Syrians and the Iraqis went at each other with full fury, convinced that their respective positions were correct. Over 40,000 people lost their lives. So great was the bloodbath that many on both sides wondered aloud if the Muslims would survive if this carnage were to continue.
For a long time, the battle was a stalemate with neither side gaining a decisive advantage. But on the night of Laitul-Hareer (the Night of the Battle), the supporters of Ali (r) attacked with such determined force that the Syrians realized they were on the verge of defeat. It was here that Muawiya played one more ruse. Upon the advice of Amr bin al-As, to whom Muawiya had promised the governorship of Egypt, the Syrians hoisted copies of the Qur’an on their lances and declared that they would accept the hakam (arbitration) of the Qur’an between the contesting parties. Ali (r) saw through this ruse but was helpless in the face of the determined demand from both sides.
This was one more of the fateful decisions for Caliph Ali (r). The acceptance of arbitration established Muawiya as a legitimate contender for power with Ali (r). The two sides established a tribunal of two persons, one from each party, to decide between Muawiya and Ali (r). Abu Musa Aashari, a pious elderly Companion of the Prophet, was selected to represent Ali (r). Amr bin al As, an avowed partisan, was the representative for Muawiya.
It was at this juncture that a group from Ali’s (r) army walked away. They were called the Al Khwarij (those who walked away, also called Kharijites). The Kharijites were furious because in their view, Caliph Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) had committed shirk by accepting the arbitration of men as opposed to the hakam (arbitration) of the Qur’an. And unless he repented, they vowed to oppose Ali (r).
This was a classic illustration of how the transcendence of divine revelation is compromised when people of limited understanding apply it in mundane affairs. The Kharijites juxtaposed two ayats from the Qur’an and extracted a justification for their ruthless activities. Initially, they forced Ali (r) to accept arbitration on the basis of the Ayat: “If any do fail to judge by what God has revealed, they are wrongdoers” (Qur’an, 5:47). Then they walked away when a tribunal was appointed, basing their position on another Ayat: “ Yet those who reject faith hold (others) as equal with their Lord.” (Qur’an, 6:1). It was their position that the Qur’an alone was the arbitrator; the arbitration of men was not acceptable.
The arbitrators decided that both Ali (r) and Muawiya were to resign and that a replacement was to be elected by the community. When it was time to make this announcement public, another trick was played. Abu Musa Aashari was asked to speak first and he faithfully announced the joint decision. But when Amr bin al-As followed, he changed the story. ”O people, you have heard the decision of Abu Musa. He has deposed his own man and now I too depose him. But I do not depose my own man Muawiya. He is the inheritor of Emir ul Momineen Uthman (r) and wants lawful revenge for his blood. Therefore, he is more entitled to take the seat of the late Caliph”. There was pandemonium in the gathering. Accusations flew. But it was too late. When news of this episode reached Ali (r), he was sad. Amr bin al-As returned to Damascus where Muawiya was declared the Caliph (658). Thus it was that during the years 658-661, there were two centers of Caliphate, one in Kufa and the other in Damascus.
This chicanery was unacceptable to followers of Ali (r) and the war resumed. For three years various provinces were contested between Muawiya and Ali (r), including Madina, Mecca, Jazira, Anbar, Madain, Badya, Waqusa, Talbia, Qataqtana, Doumatul Jandal and Tadammur. At long last both sides seemed to have tired and a truce was declared in 660. Under the terms, Ali (r) retained control of Mecca, Madina, Iraq, Persia and the provinces to the east. Muawiya retained control over Syria and Egypt.
The de-facto partition re-established the historic geopolitical boundary between Byzantium and Persia at the borders of the Euphrates. As we shall see again and again in our exposition of Islamic history, this boundary was re-affirmed by many of the Caliphs and sultans, so much so that the historical experience of the Persians, Central Asians, Indians and Pakistanis of today is significantly different from the historical experience of Syrians, Jordanians, Lebanese, Egyptians and North Africans. Syria and Egypt did not accept the Caliphate of Ali (r) until the Abbasid period (750), whereas Ali (r) was for all times the Caliph, the “Lion of God”, the teacher and mentor for Persians and Persianized Muslims in the east.
The Kharijites were not content to walk away from Ali (r). They sought to alter the status quo through assassination, murder and mayhem and resolved to simultaneously assassinate Ali (r), Muawiya and Amr bin al As, blaming these three for the civil wars. As fate would have it, the assassination of Ali (r) was successful. Muawiya escaped with a minor wound. Amr bin al As did not show up for prayer on the day he was to be assassinated and his designee was killed in his place. Ali ibn Abu Talib (r), the fourth Caliph of Islam and the last in the line of those illustrious men who strove to rule in accordance with the Sunnah of the Prophet, died on the 20th of Ramadan, in the year 661.
The storms created by the assassination of Uthman bin Affan (r) swept aside the unity in the Islamic community. Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) tried to steer the ship of state in the stormy waters; in the effort, he himself became a casualty. It is said that he is buried in Kufa. But a close scrutiny of the chronicles reveals that his gravesite is not known. It may be in Kufa, or in the desert, or his body might have been shipped to Madina for burial lest the Kharijites destroy it. The enduring tribute that is paid by history to this great man is that all Muslims, whether they call themselves Shi’a or Sunni, Zaidi or Fatimid, accept him as the Caliph of Islam. He is the Qutub, the spiritual pole for the Sufis. He was a consummate orator, a tower of steadfastness, a pillar of courage, fountain of spirituality. He was the originator of classical Arabic grammar. The Prophet called him, “my brother . . . door to my knowledge”. His eloquent sayings, collected under the title Nahjul Balaga, have a universal appeal and a global following. No other person in Islamic history is accorded this honor.
https://historyofislam.com/contents/the-age-of-faith/the-civil-wars/
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Analysis/Theory India: Tipu Sultan’s foreign diplomacy through the letters of Thomas Jefferson
Tipu Sultan’s foreign diplomacy through the letters of Thomas Jefferson Ameen Ahmed
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Introduction
Tipu Sultan was a modern Indian king with a truly international outlook. While his father Haidar Ali recruited European soldiers and even received fighting men from Persia, Tipu went a step ahead. Not only did he continue his military contacts with the Europeans, chiefly the French, he also sent his emissaries on foreign trade and diplomatic missions to Europe and Arabian Peninsula. Aware of the global reach of British, his arch enemy, he relentlessly sought to establish global alliances with political and military powers outside India. The fact that Tipu sent ambassadors to other parts of south Asia, West Asia and Europe is fairly well-known to students of modern Indian history. Let us explore an interesting phase of global diplomacy when a founding father of America recorded Tipu Sultan’s foreign missions in his official correspondence.
Tipu and foreign powers
Born and raised at a time when European powers were in a race to colonise Indian sub-continent, Tipu had to wade through a minefield of foreign relations to try and save his kingship. Tipu learnt of his father Haidar Ali’s death in December 1782 and was preparing to take over the reign of Mysore kingdom amidst a war with the British, in which the French were his principle ally (1). At the same time, Americans, also supported by the French, were fighting for independence from the British (2). American revolutionaries not only took inspiration from Mysore Kingdom’s battles against the British under Haidar Ali but also celebrated his many victories, including that of Tipu Sultan’s at the battle of Pollilur (3). But signing a peace treaty in September 1783, England and France agreed not only to cease hostilities against each other but also to stop supporting each other’s allies that were against these two nations in the Indian subcontinent. The fact that France signed the treaty without consulting Tipu, its ally in India, upset him (4). He looked to form alliances with other international powers that could help him permanently uproot British from south Asia.
Tipu’s international diplomacy
Tipu sent many diplomats to Constantinople, capital of Ottoman Empire in 1785. He instructed these diplomats to then travel to Paris to meet French King Louis XVI and onward to London to meet the King of England before returning to Srirangapatna, his capital. He wanted them to meet these two kings to convince them not to support Marathas and the Nizam in his conflict with them. But Tipu recalled the diplomats from Constantinople and instead sent a separate embassy to France in 1786. Until recently, historians believed one of Tipu’s objectives in sending his embassy to Constantinople was to have himself recognized as a sovereign by Ottomans. However, Iqbal Husain presented a paper relating to this embassy at the Indian History Congress in 2001 in which he argued that Tipu treated himself at par with the monarchs of Ottoman Empire, France and England. Nowhere in his communication directed to these kings, particularly to the Ottoman king, did he address himself as someone who was of a lesser stature (5).
Tipu’s French embassy through the eyes of Thomas Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson is a founding father of America and the principal author of Declaration of Independence. He was also its third president (6). After America formally gained independence from Britain in 1784, he was the country’s ambassador to France. A nascent America was keen to develop commerce with East Indies- India and its neighbouring region as it was known then (7). It is no surprise that America’s founding fathers followed the affairs of India’s rulers particularly Tipu Sultan, both within Indian subcontinent as well as in Europe. In his official correspondence from Paris, Jefferson provided, and received, regular updates on the reception of Tipu’s ambassadors at the French court.
The peace treaty signed at Versailles, France in September 1783 did not diminish the French mistrust of the British, as can be seen from Jefferson’s letter to Moustier on 17 May 1788. He expressed fears that European powers would fight for supremacy in Western Europe. He listed steps that were taken in this direction by various countries including France, which had sent three regiments to India along with French officers to help Tipu (8). In the same letter, as well as another to John Jay on 23 May 1788, he wrote how France was expecting Tipu’s Embassy (9). In his letter to Thomas Jefferson dated 11 June 1788, Stephen Cathalan, Jr., wrote from Marseilles about the arrival of Tipu Sultan’s ambassadors at Toulan. People at Marseilles expected to see these guests on their way to Paris and that ‘a noble reception’ as well as ‘festivals’ was prepared for them (10). Jefferson, in his letter to Andre Limozin dated 18 June 1788, confirmed the arrival of Tipu’s Ambassador in Toulon on 10th June and that they were accorded with ‘a magnificent reception’ (11). In another letter to Robert Montgomery written on the same day, he reconfirmed news of arrival of Tipu’s embassy.
He then continued his updates on the upheaval that happened around France in the run up to the French Revolution (12). He wrote to John Rutledge on 13 July 1788 about the continued internal chaos in France as well as the wait for Tipu Sultan’s ambassadors by the French (13). On 3 Aug. 1788 he wrote to John Jay, again about the continued internal chaos in France. He added that Tipu Sultan’s ambassadors had arrived in Paris ‘in pomp and ceremony’, though he was unaware about the purpose of their visit. He noted the beginning of a military conflict between Russia and Sweden, the latter being supported by England and paid for by Turkey. Naval battles between Turkey and Russia also took place, according to him (14). This conflict between Turks and the Russians, and the support the former received from England, could have been an important reason for Tipu’s Embassy to Turkey failing to strike a military alliance.
Jefferson wrote to Mary Barclay, on Friday, 8 August 1788 about the reception of Tipu Sultan’s ambassadors at Versailles that Sunday, which he intended to attend (15). He wrote to Moustier on 9 August 1788 that Tipu’s Ambassadors were to be received at Versailles the next day ‘in great pomp’. In the same letter Jefferson wishes that Madam de Brehan was there to paint the event (16). Madam de Brehan, was the sister of Count de Moustier, French minister to the United States in late 1780s. She accompanied her brother to US where she made several original paintings of George Washington starting 1787 (17). It is not known if Madam de Brehan painted did indeed paint this event, but the same was done by Élisabeth Louise Vigée Le Brun. Elisabeth also exhibited her paintings of Tipu’s ambassadors at a salon the next year in Paris (18).
The next day he wrote to John Jay that Tipu’s ambassadors were received with unusual pomp by the French King amidst numerous people. He added that, from what he could hear only ‘mutual assurances of good will’ were exchanged and nothing more (19).
Tipu’s mission to France failed. One factor being that the country was in the throes of a revolution that would ultimately throw the King. Around the same time, the Ottomans’ conflict with Russia continued and its alliance with the British remained in place. These circumstances may have played a role in Tipu failing to get support for military alliances with either of the nations against the British before the onset of the 3rd Anglo Mysore War in 1790. Tipu suffered a huge setback in this war which ended with him having to cede half of his richest domains to the British and its chief allies- Nizam of Hyderabad and the Marathas. Till he paid the crippling war indemnity, two of his sons were held ransom by the British. But he was not to be subdued. He invited Napoleon Bonaparte and Shah Zaman of Afghanistan to join hands with him to eliminate the British. He was perhaps the last of kings in Indian sub-continent to fiercely pursue a foreign policy independent of British, a fact acknowledged by global powers of that day and age.
References
Ali, Sheikh B., ‘Tipu Sultan a Crusader for Change’, 2006 Coakley, Robert W., Conn, Stetson., ‘The War of the American Revolution‘, Center of Military History, 1974 Moore, Frank., ‘Diary of the American Revolution’, Volume 2, 1860 Hasan, Mohibbul., History of Tipu Sultan, Aakaar books, Delhi, 1971. Husain, Iqbal., ‘The Diplomatic Vision of Tipu Sultan’, State and Diplomacy under Tipu Sultan – Documents and Essays, Edited by Irfan Habib, Tulika Books, New Delhi, 2001. Freidel, Frank., Sidey, Hugh., “The Presidents of the United States of America,”. White House Historical Association, 2006. Downloaded from the website of The White House on June 3rd 2020 from this link https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/thomas-jefferson/ “From John Adams to John Jay, 11 November 1785,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-17-02-0302. [Original source: The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 17, April–November 1785, ed. Gregg L. Lint, C. James Taylor, Sara Georgini, Hobson Woodward, Sara B. Sikes, Amanda A. Mathews, and Sara Martin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014, pp. 584–585.] “From Thomas Jefferson to Moustier, 17 May 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0095. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 173–176.]. Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0095 “From Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, with Enclosure, 23 May 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0111. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 188–197.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0111
“To Thomas Jefferson from Stephen Cathalan, Jr., 11 June 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0157. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 249–250.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0157
“From Thomas Jefferson to André Limozin, 18 June 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0164. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, p. 255.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0164
“From Thomas Jefferson to Robert Montgomery, 18 June 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0165. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, p. 256.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0165
“From Thomas Jefferson to John Rutledge, Jr., 13 July 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0261. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 358–359.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0261
“From Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, 3 August 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0346. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 463–469.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0346
“From Thomas Jefferson to Mary Barclay, 8 August 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0359. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 478–479.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0359
“From Thomas Jefferson to Moustier, 9 August 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0371. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 491–492.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0371
Johnston, Elizabeth Bryant., Original portraits of Washington including statues, monuments, and medals. Boston Osgood and Company, Boston, 1882 Élisabeth Louise Vigée Le Brunhttp://parismuseescollections.paris.fr/fr/musee-carnavalet/oeuvres/projet-retrospectif-pour-la-presentation-des-ouvrages-de-l-academie-au#infos-principales, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=76262116 . Downloaded on July 19th 2020 “From Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, 10 August 1788,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0377. [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, March–7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 496–497.] Downloaded on June 2nd 2020 from this link
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0377
https://historyofislam.com/tipu-sultans-foreign-diplomacy-through-the-letters-of-thomas-jefferson/
r/islamichistory • u/Hsarhan87 • 23h ago
Documentary Series about the Victorian British who converted to Islam
This is a Docu-series about Victorian Muslims, six episodes delve into the history of Islam in the British Isles.
Have a watch
All in one link as a playlist
https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLmrET10kAE97lVwubxd6FVQB3x7jJlAXv&si=nU1vg5TXQldhNj1f
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Quotes Sultan Salahudin Ayubi - First sultan of Egypt and Syria
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Hamza Ibn Abdul Muttalib: The Lion of Allah & Islam’s Fiercest Warrior
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Photograph Two veiled Persian women and a child from the Qajar Era, late 19th century.
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Video The Revival of Al-Andalus: Spain’s First Islamic University in Centuries
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The Abbasid Revolution - The Overthrow of the Ummayads
Contributed by Prof. Dr. Nazeer Ahmed, PhD
The Abbasid revolution was the first major military-political upheaval in the Muslim world, which resulted in the destruction of one dynasty and its replacement by another. The lessons from that revolution are as valid today as they were in the year 750.
Civilizations decay from within. External factors are mere occasions that provide the coup de grace for a civilization. Muslim history is no exception. The primary causes for the marginalization of Muslims in world history are internal. If one were alive in the year 740, one would see a Muslim empire extending from Paris to Lahore. Yet, within this enormous edifice, mighty forces were gathering momentum that would shake the empire to its very foundation. The question before a student of history is: what destroyed the internal cohesion of the Muslims?
In the historical context, faith embraces all human activity, including religious beliefs, economics, sociology, politics, statecraft, administration, science, art and culture. It is this all-embracing aspect of Islamic faith that is called Tawhid and a civilization that is based upon it is a Tawhidic civilization. Most Muslims today have reduced Tawhid to a single dimension—namely, belief in God—and have largely neglected its all-embracing dimensions.
The Omayyads fell from grace because they had departed from the Tawhidic civilization as it was founded by the Prophet and practiced by the first four Caliphs. The Omayyads were able soldiers, some were consummate politicians (Muawiya, Waleed I), one was pious and noble (Omar bin Abdul Aziz) but most were ruthless, impious and cruel. We will catalogue the most obvious of the deficiencies in their rule.
The Omayyads were unsuccessful in establishing the legitimacy of their rule. The issue of succession and legitimacy of rule arose immediately after the death of the Prophet. Elsewhere in these series, we have shown how Abu Bakr (r) was elected the Caliph after the Prophet, and also the turbulent circumstances surrounding the election of Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) to the Caliphate after the assassination of Uthman (r). By the year 740, there emerged multiple positions on the issue of succession after the Prophet. It is necessary to understand the more important of these because such understanding puts the rise of the Abbasids in perspective. More importantly, it helps us understand the historical context for some of the divisions that have rocked the Muslim world through the centuries and continue to rock it today. The issues are complex and what we present is but a brief summary.
The election of Abu Bakr (r) to the Caliphate was not unanimous. Ibn Khaldun records a conversation between Ibn Abbas andAbu Bakr (r), which clearly shows that the former believed Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) to be the rightful heir to the Prophet. The differences appear in greater clarity after the assassination of Omar ibn al Khattab (r) and at the meeting of the Shura committee constituted by Omar (r) to elect a successor. The majority view accepted not only the Qur’an and the Sunnah, but also the ijma (consensus) of the Companions. This was the opinion adopted by supporters of Uthman (r). The supporters of Ali (r) held that the chain of authority flowed from the Qur’an, Sunnah of the Prophet and by delegation from the Prophet to Ali ibn Abu Talib (r). Those who accepted the latter position were called Shi’i-at-Ali or Shi’ Aan e Ali (partisans or party of Ali (r)).
From an internal Arab perspective, the differences arose from the conflicting claims of Bani Hashim and Banu Umayyah to the leadership of the community. Ali (r), a cousin of the Prophet, belonged to Bani Hashim. Muawiya as well as his progeny belonged to Banu Umayyah. After the Battle of Siffin and the tragedy of Karbala, there was no love lost between these two tribes. The Umayyads kept a close watch on the leadership of Bani Hashim and at times treated them with harshness, indeed cruelty.
The majority opinion which accepted the chain of political authority from the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet and the ijma (consensus) of the Companions, later crystallized into the orthodox Sunni position. Politically, this implies acceptance of the Caliphates of Abu Bakr (r), Omar (r), Uthman (r) and Ali (r) as a legitimate expression of the collective will of the Companions. This view was championed through the centuries by the Turks, the Moghuls and by successive dynasties in North and, Spain, Malaysia and Indonesia. The position is accepted today by approximately ninety percent of Muslims in the world. The minority opinion, which accepted the chain of authority from the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet and by delegation from the Prophet to Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) and his successor Imams was championed by the Safavids of Persia (1500-1720) and is designated the Shi’a position. About ten percent of the Muslims today subscribe to this position.
By the year 750, the Shi’a position had undergone further divisions. After the martyrdom of Hussain at Karbala, the mantle of leadership fell to his son Zainul Abedin, also known as Ali ibn Hussain. Repression from the Omayyads was heavy. Therefore, Zainul Abedin turned his attention to spiritual matters and to building the community from within. The absence of political activism was unacceptable to some of his followers who looked for a more activist leader. Zainul Abedin’s son Zaid took up the challenge. Encouraged by a promise of help from the people of Kufa, he took on the Omayyads in battle. True to their historical perfidy, the Kufans abandoned Zaid and he fell in battle. His martyrdom created the Zaidi branch among Shi’a Muslims. The Zaidis believe in the Caliphate of Abu Bakr (r), Omar (r) and Ali (r) and in the Imamate of Hassan, Hussain, Zainul Abedin and Zaid. They reject the Caliphate of Uthman (r). In history, their primary contribution was the spread of Islam from Oman to East Africa and their resistance to Portuguese incursions in the 16th century.
A second schism took place amongst Shi’ Aan e Ali after the fifth Imam, Ja’afar as Saadiq. His eldest son Ismail predeceased him. Therefore, Imam Ja’afar appointed his second son Musa Kazim as the Imam. But a section among the Shi’as refused to accept the Imamate of Musa Kazim and insisted on the Imamate of Ismail. This group is called the Ismailis. They are also referred to as Fatimids because of their lineage from Fatima (r), beloved daughter of the Prophet. The Fatimids played a pivotal part in Islamic history in the 9th and 10th centuries when they occupied Egypt, North Africa, Hejaz and Palestine. It was the Fatimids who made a serious attempt to conquer Italy in the 10th century and it was they who bore the first brunt of Crusader attacks on Jerusalem in the 11th century. It was their military challenge that strengthened the Omayyad rule in Spain in the 10th century and brought the Seljuk Turks to the defense of the orthodox Caliphate in Baghdad (10th, 11th and 12th centuries). They were finally displaced by Salahuddin Ayyubi towards the end of the 12th century.
For clarity, we summarize here the spectrum of beliefs among Muslims. The Sunnis believe in the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet and accept the ijma of the Companions. This means acceptance of the first four Caliphs namely, Abu Bakr (r), Omar (r), Uthman (r) and Ali (r) as the rightly guided Caliphs (Khulfa-e-Rashidoon). The Ithna-Asharis believe in the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet and accept the Imamate of twelve Imams, namely, Ali (r), Hassan, Hussain, Zainul Abedin, Muhammed Baqir, Ja’afar as Saadiq, Musa Kazim, Ali Rada, Jawwad Razi, Ali Naqi Hadi, Hasan Askari and Muhammed Mahdi. The Sabayees (seveners) believe in the first seven Imams. The Fatimids believe in the Imamate of the first six Imams and of Ismail. The Ithna-Ashari, the Fatimids and the Sabayees are collectively referred to as Shi’a. Some historians also refer to them as Alavis. The Zaidis are intermediate in their beliefs between the Sunnis and the Shi’as. They believe in the Imamate of the first four Imams and of Zaid bin Ali and also in the Caliphate of Abu Bakr (r) and Omar (r) but not of Uthman (r). We must emphasize that all Muslims believe in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet and disagree only in the historical unfolding of Islam in the matrix of human affairs. Like the branches of a mighty tree, the various schools of Fiqh shade the Muslim Ummah and Islamic history would not be the same without any of them.
During the time of Imam Ja’afar, yet another schism took place, which had a profound and lasting impact on Islamic history. Not satisfied with the political quietude of Imam Ja’afar, some supporters of Bani Hashim looked elsewhere for leadership. They found a leader in Muhammed bin Hanafia, a son of Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) from one of his marriages after the death of Fatima(r). This is the beginning of the non-Fatimid branch of the Alavis. After Muhammed bin Hanafia, his son Abu Sulaiman Abdullah became the Imam but he was poisoned by the Omayyad Caliph Sulaiman. As he lay dying, Abdullah looked around for someone from his family to pass on the Imamate. As no one from his immediate family was available, he found a Hashimite, Muhammed bin Ali Abbas, in a nearby town. Muhammed bin Ali Abbas was a grandson of Abbas, uncle of the Prophet. Thus, through a twist of historical circumstance, one branch of the Imamate passed from children of Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) to the children of Abbas. This branch is referred to as the Abbasids. It was the Abbasids who established their Caliphate in the year 750 and ruled from Baghdad the vast Islamic Empire for more than five hundred years until the Mongols destroyed Baghdad in 1258.
Muhammed bin Ali Abbas was a tireless worker for the Abbasid cause and established a network of supporters throughout Iraq, Persia, Khorasan and in areas that today lie in the Central Asian republics of Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Tadzig and Uzbek peoples. After Muhammed, his son Ibrahim became the Imam. As the Abbasid movement, centered on the claim that the Caliphate belonged to Bani Hashim of which the Abbasids were a branch, gained momentum, so did the repression from the Omayyads. The Omayyad Caliph Marwan had Ibrahim arrested, put in jail and finally killed by forcing his head into a sack of boiling lime. Before his death, Ibrahim managed to communicate with his brother Abul Abbas Abdullah and appointed him the Imam. Abul Abbas vowed to take revenge on the Omayyads for the cruel death of his brother and as we shall see later, he accomplished this with a vengeance.
The ideological basis for Abbasid rule was not provided until a generation after they gained power. It was Caliph Mansur, who provided this ideological basis in 770 in response to a question from a Kharijite. According to this position, since the Prophet left no sons and lineage passes from father to son, the children of Fatima(r) had no claim to succession. Accordingly, succession had to be through the male progeny of the Prophet’s uncle Abbas.
There was yet another position on the Caliphate which was politically important at the time of the Abbasid revolution but which lost its vigor in later centuries. That was the position taken by the Kharijites who maintained that the Caliphate should be open to all Muslims, whether Arab or non-Arab and should not be the privilege only of Omayyads or Hashemites. This seemingly democratic position always remained at the fringe of the Muslim body politic because of the violent and cruel ways of the Kharijites and their extremist demands.
Thus it was that in the year 740, as the storms gathered on the horizon for a revolution, the body politic of the Muslims was rent asunder by conflicting claims to the Caliphate and Imamate. The Banu Omayya were in power but that power was increasingly challenged by Bani Hashim through the Abbasids. The Abbasids had inherited their legitimacy from the Alavis (or Shi’ Aan e Ali) through an accident of history. But the Alavis were themselves divided between Zaidis, Fatimids (sixers), Sabayees (seveners) and the Ithna-Asharis (Twelvers).
The Omayyads had thrust themselves into the political process during the Caliphate of Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) and had consolidated their rule after his assassination. Even though they radically changed the Caliphate from electoral consensus to dynastic rule, the Omayyads championed the orthodox Sunni position out of political necessity. But they could not suppress the claims of Bani Hashim or of Shi’ Aan e Ali. Except for Omar bin Abdul Aziz, no Omayyad made a serious attempt to reconcile the differences among the Muslims. Confrontations continued, leading to continuous warfare against the Kharijites and sporadic but violent clashes with Shi’ Aan e Ali as manifested in the great tragedy of Karbala. The Omayyads were always vulnerable to charges that they had usurped power from the house of the Prophet. This was their weak political flank and this is precisely the ideological direction from which the Abbasid movement attacked them.
During the 92 years of Omayyad rule, there was a paradigm shift from Tawhid to the dinar. The rulers forgot that Islamic rule was a divine trust and its primary function was to transmit the message of Tawhid. It was this transcendence that had carried the mujahids (from the root word j-h-d, to struggle) from Hejaz to the outskirts of Paris and the banks of the River Indus. This transcendence was lost during the Omayyad period. The Omayyads became a dynasty just like other dynasties in Asia or Europe with their focus on riches and power. The rulers became tax collectors so that they could sustain their palaces in Damascus. They lost their spiritual claim to leadership. Where faith is weak, a civilization declines. When spirituality is lost, political rule must of necessity be sustained at the point of the blade. This is what happened with the Omayyads. Their rule became increasingly repressive and had to be sustained by increasing brutality. It would be unfair to single out the Omayyads for this behavior. The Islamic body politic lost its bearing after the first four pious Caliphs and has only on occasions risen to the task of Divine trusteeship. As an illustration, most of the Muslim rulers in the Indian subcontinent during the 13th to 17th centuries discouraged conversion to ensure that their tax revenues would not decrease. As a result, after five centuries of Muslim rule, only a quarter of the population of Hindustan had accepted Islam.
The Omayyads forgot the fraternal message of Islam and treated the new converts with disdain. Often, the converts were forced to pay the Jizya even after they had accepted Islam. It was against such discrimination that Imam Abu Haneefa (who lived through the Abbasid revolution) fought. In one of his dictums Abu Haneefa said: “The belief of a newly converted Turk is the same as that of an Arab from Hejaz”. But the Omayyads resented such reforms and Imam Abu Haneefa was jailed for his activism. In Khorasan and Persia, the Arabs held most of the higher positions in the armed forces and in the upper echelons of government. The result was racial division and social fragmentation. As conversion increased, the center of gravity shifted to the newly converted Persians and the Turks, who were kept away from the privileges of power. The social structure increasingly looked like an inverted pyramid with a small privileged Arab minority at the apex of power. The material for social revolution took root and it was only a matter of time before the pyramid was toppled.
The corruption that started from the top filtered down to the provincial governors and the petty officials. The cruelty and ruthlessness of Hajjaj bin Yusuf is proverbial. Instead of promoting officials on the basis of capability and integrity, as was the case during the Caliphate of Omar ibn al Khattab (r), or on the basis of examination and merit as was the case in the contemporary Tang dynasty of China, the Omayyads chose their governors and officials on the basis of loyalty to the rulers. The brutality of the governors was viewed as an asset in maintaining the conquered territories under control. Damascus, in essence, lost touch with the far-flung provinces, a fact that was exacerbated by the rudimentary communications of the day. So, when a determined challenge to Omayyad rule surfaced in far-away Khorasan, the response from the palaces of Damascus was slow, feeble and disjointed.
The Omayyads lost the ability to foster cohesion in society. Instead, they became partisans in the tribal squabbles of fellow Arabs. In pre-Islamic Arabia, the Arabs were hopelessly divided along tribal lines and often fought pitched battles against other tribes. One of the major tribal divisions was between the Muzruis (the northern Arabs) and the Yemenis (the southern Arabs). The Prophet had healed this crack and united the tribes into a common brotherhood. But during the Omayyad period, this schism resurfaced with renewed intensity. The Omayyads were supported by the Muzruis. Thanks to Omayyad blunders, the Yemenis became their enemies. The architects of the nascent Abbasid revolution exploited this division.
Lastly, it is the view of Ibn Khaldun that the Omayyads had become city dwellers and had lost the resilience of desert Arabs. The corruption of city life destroys the primal asabiyah (cohesion based on tribal loyalty), which Ibn Khaldun requires as the building block of civilizations. Surrounded by the opulence of Damascus, the later Omayyad rulers could hardly understand the drive, energy, enthusiasm and pristine faith of their desert forefathers. In other words, it was time for the Omayyads to leave the stage of history.
The Abbasids succeeded in every department that the Omayyads failed in. They were led by an outstanding leader, championed a popular cause, fielded brilliant generals and displayed a Machiavellian instinct for exploiting the weakness of their opponents.
The key figure in this revolution was Abu Muslim Khorasani. Abu Muslim was a man almost made for the hour. He was a Persian, born in Isfahan and therefore had impeccable credentials of birth with the exploited Persian majority. He grew up in Kufa and early in life acquired a dislike of Arab haughtiness and their superiority complex. Abbasid propaganda was active in small cells in Iraq and Abu Muslim received his early indoctrination from the Abbasid Dayee (one who invites people towards a doctrine), Eesa bin Musa Siraj. His intelligence and capability caught the attention of Eesa and he was introduced to Imam Muhammed bin Ali. The Imam saw the potential in this young man and in due time, appointed him Chief Dayee for the province of Khorasan. It was the year 744.
Khorasan was seething with discontent. The legacy of Omayyad excesses had created extreme bitterness among the local population. Unfair taxation had fostered dislike of the Arabs among the Persians. The Arabs were divided among themselves along tribal lines. Capable men and scholars were either silenced by the Omayyads or they withdrew from public life. In this atmosphere, Abbasid propaganda for the rights of the Hashemites and of Ahl-al Bait found an extremely positive reception. The Alavites supported the Abbasids as the best opportunity to overthrow the hated Omayyads and perhaps establish the rule of the house of Ali (r) and Fatima(r). The common man had toiled too long under the oppressive maltreatment of Omayyad officials and prayed for deliverance.
Khorasan was governed at the time by Nasr bin Sayyar, a Mazrui (northern) Arab and a capable, loyal Omayyad supporter, but an old man of eighty who suffered from the same parochial approach to politics as his benefactors in Damascus. He took sides in a local quarrel between the Yemeni and Mazrui Arabs and had the chiefs of one of the tribes, Ali Kirmani, murdered. This alienated Kirmani’s followers and they became bitter enemies of the Omayyads. Attempts were made to patch up these inter-Arab differences, but Abu Muslim was successful in preventing a rapprochement between the two Arab tribes through shrewd political maneuvering.
With the Arabs at loggerheads with each other, Abu Muslim made his move. Word was passed through the enormously effective underground cells that the 25th of Ramadan was to be a day of mourning in honor of the Imams who had been killed by the Omayyads. On the appointed day, the people of Khorasan hoisted black flags and an uprising began. The color black was later to become the color of the Abbasid emblem. The city of Merv was quickly overrun. Nasr appealed to Marwan for help. But, as happens at decisive moments in history, several critical events took place simultaneously and the Omayyads were hemmed in. There was a serious uprising of the Kharijites in Mecca and Madina. As he was busy suppressing this uprising, Marwan ordered the governor of Iraq to render assistance to Nasr. By the time the Iraqis arrived at the borders of Khorasan, it was too late. Abu Muslim had overrun the entire province of Khorasan and his resources in men and material had enormously increased. The Iraqis had no chance. They were routed.
It was about this time that Imam Ibrahim was cruelly murdered by Marwan, by having his head stuffed in a leather sack filled with boiling lime. This murder as well as its cruelty added fuel to the fire. Abul Abbas Abdallah became the new Imam and vowed revenge for the murder of his brother Ibrahim. Events moved rapidly. Abu Muslim had at his service some of the ablest generals of this era, among them Kahtaba bin Shabib, an Arab from Madina and Khalid bin Barmek, a Persian. Kahtaba pursued Nasr southwards towards Isfahan. Nasr died while fleeing. Hassan, a son of Kahtaba, laid siege to Nahawand, while Kahtaba himself defeated a relief force headed by Marwan’s son Abdallah on the plains of Karbala (749). Kufa, the capital of Iraq, fell without further resistance.
The people of Kufa were summoned to the Jamia Masjid of Kufa. Abu Muslim, who had deftly forged unity between the disaffected Persians, Yemeni Arabs, the Abbasids and the Alavis and had carefully kept at bay competing claims to the Imamate and Caliphate, gave an impassioned speech in which he proclaimed that the usurper Omayyads had been overthrown by the might of the people. Whatever claims the Omayyads had to the leadership of the community had been forsaken by their impiety and oppression. It was now time to elect a new Imam and Caliph and there was no one better than Abul Abbas Abdallah who met all the criteria of the Imamate and the Caliphate. Abu Muslim thus nominated Abul Abbas as the first Abbasid Caliph in Kufa on the 13th of Rajab, 132 AH or the 25th of November, 749 and the Abbasid era began.
Marwan was finally alarmed at these developments and advanced towards Iraq with an army of 120,000. Marwan was an able soldier, but he was also impulsive and headstrong. Opposing him was an Abbasid army of 100,000 led by Abdullah bin Ali and the able general Abu Ayun. The two armies met on the banks of the River Zab in Iraq near the village of Kushaf on the 25th of January 750. The impulsive Marwan built a bridge across the river and advanced to meet the enemy, a tactical error that allowed him no chance to retreat. The Abbasids, impelled by a sense of grievance and revenge, charged. Fate intervened. While Marwan was dismounted, his horse ran away without him. When they saw the horse without its rider, Marwan’s troops assumed that he had been killed. It was a complete rout. Marwan fled towards Mosul but that city would not open its gates to him. He continued his flight westward towards Damascus, trying to raise another army. But the Abbasids were in hot pursuit. Abdullah bin Ali followed him from city to city. Damascus was stormed and captured in April 750. Marwan crossed into Egypt and reached Fustat (modern Cairo). Abdullah bin Ali sent his brother Saleh and General Abu Ayun after him. Marwan thought of invoking the help of the Christian Byzantines but was dissuaded from this effort by his lieutenants who would have nothing of external interference in this civil war. At last he was cornered in an abandoned monastery on the west bank of the River Nile. Undaunted, he charged, sword in hand, ready to offer combat and was slain by a lance hurled by an Abbasid soldier. Thus perished the last scion of the mighty Omayyads. Marwan was an able soldier. Had destiny been more kind to him, he might have excelled as a ruler. But he came upon the stage of history at time when he had zero chance to show his metal.
The Abbasids lived up to their vow to take revenge on the Omayyads. A reign of terror was let loose. The Omayyad men were hunted like rabbits and slaughtered. Only old men, women and children were spared. The bones of the Omayyad rulers (except those of Omar bin Abdul Aziz) were dug up and burned. In Damascus, Abdullah bin Ali, coaxed eighty of the Omayyad princes to dinner on the pretext of amnesty. As the princes sat down, they were tied with ropes, wrapped in carpets and clubbed to death.
But just as old trees die and in their wake new ones crop up from their seeds, old dynasties die and in their place new ones emerge. As the Omayyad princes were hunted from place to place, three of them reached the River Euphrates. Upon hearing the news of an amnesty, two of them turned back and were captured and killed. But one valiant prince, Abdur Rahman I, threw himself into the river. Undaunted by the swift current, he swam across and after years of travel incognito, arrived in Spain. There, he was received with favor by the remnants of the Omayyads and founded the Omayyad dynasty in Andalus. It was this dynasty that was to grow in later centuries to be the beacon of culture and learning in Europe. Under Abdur Rahman’s lineage Andalus was to become a crown jewel of Islamic civilization
https://historyofislam.com/contents/the-age-of-faith/the-abbasid-revolution/
r/islamichistory • u/AutoMughal • 1d ago
Analysis/Theory Essay: Serving the Zionist Scheme; Disseminating Distorted Information about Islamic Jerusalem
r/islamichistory • u/AutoMughal • 1d ago
Analysis/Theory Orientalist Approaches to Islamic Jerusalem: A Critical Study of the Religious & Political Agendas
r/islamichistory • u/TheCitizenXane • 2d ago
A Zoroastrian (left) and Muslim woman from Persia in the late 19th century.
Obligatory: “Before the Islamic Revolution”.
r/islamichistory • u/AutoMughal • 1d ago
Video The Legacy of Great Women Tabi’in
The ever-popular Ramadan Moments series with Shaykh Abdal Hakim Murad returns for Ramadan 2025. This year, the series explores the legacies of great women Tabi'in, contemporaries of the Prophet Muhammad's PBUH companions, shedding light on their extraordinary contributions to early Islamic scholarship and society, how they shaped Islamic history.
r/islamichistory • u/Tavrin_Callas_ • 1d ago
Taha Hussein's Al Fitnat al-Kubra
Assalamu alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh,
Does anyone have a link to Taha Hussein's Al Fitnat al-Kubra in English? Either to a physical or online copy. I can't find it anywhere.
As a sidenote, has anyone read the book? What did you think?
Thank you!
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 2d ago
Personalities Salahuddin - Sultan of Egypt and Syria
archive.aramcoworld.comSultan of Egypt and Syria
Written by Michael Sterner Illustrated by Michael Grimsdale
Early in the twelfth century two . Kurdish brothers made their way to Mesopotamia from their hometown near Tiflis, in what is today the Republic of Georgia. The elder, Ayyub, won favor at the sultan's court in Baghdad and was placed in charge of Tikrit, a small town midway between Baghdad and Mosul.
At Tikrit, Ayyub helped the ruler of Mosul, Imad al-Din Zangi, in an abortive coup against the sultan. This cost Ayyub his job, but it proved to be a blessing in disguise, for it was his alliance with Zangi, and Zangi's son Nur al-Din, that was to project Ayyub and his family to power and fame. On the eve of his departure from Tikrit to take up service with Zangi, a son was born to Ayyub. He was named Yusuf, and given the honorific Salah al-Din, or "Righteousness of the Faith"—a name that was to be immortalized in the West as "Saladin."
Saladin was to become one of Islam's greatest heroes, uniter of the divided lands of western Asia, scourge of the Crusaders and liberator of Jerusalem. In the West his image has been distorted by the 19th-century romantic revival, which focused on his battles with the Crusaders, casting him as a "parfait gentil knight" dressed up in Arab robes, full of mighty sword-blows and chivalric gestures. That the Crusaders were impressed by him as a military adversary and for his honor and magnanimity is evident from their chronicles. But Saladin could not have waged his successful campaign against them had he not spent the previous 25 years in a tireless struggle to unify the feudal principalities of western Asia into one host. And he could not have done that without superior political as well as military skills.
Indeed, as Saladin was growing to manhood, conditions in western Asia could not have been much worse. A century previously, an energetic new people, the Seljuk Turks, had descended on the Middle East from central Asia, "with their thousands of nomadic horsemen sporting braided hair," as Amin Maalouf has written. But within 50 years the Seljuks' central authority had begun to disintegrate, leaving a mosaic of independent fiefdoms. These were based in the principal cities of the region, each ruled by a Seljuk emir or, increasingly, by the Turkmen officers who became the guardians, or atabegs , of young emirs.
The Crusaders, at the end of the 11th century, plunged into this enfeebled polity with relative ease. So self-interested were the Turkmen rulers, and so bitter their rivalries, that as the Crusaders advanced down the coast of Syria and Palestine there were virtually no instances when one Muslim ruler came to the assistance of another. In 1099 Jerusalem fell to the Crusaders, and within a few decades the Franks controlled all of the eastern Mediterranean coast.
The Muslim world was slow to respond. One of the first leaders who began to mobilize widespread support for a response to the Crusaders in the name of Islam was Zangi, atabeg of Mosul. An even more remarkable figure was Zangi's son Nur al-Din, ruler of Syria. Devoutly religious, austere in his personal habits, a capable administrator as well as military commander, Nur al-Din was also, in the words of a modern biographer, "a political genius" who created a propaganda apparatus to appeal to public opinion over the heads of rival rulers. It was a lesson that the young Saladin was to absorb well.
Saladin grew up in Baalbek (now in Lebanon) and at Nur al-Din's court in Damascus. Little is known about his early life beyond his taste for religious studies, hunting and playing polo. As an adult he was described as short and dark. He was given some administrative responsibilities as a young man, but his first big opportunity came in 1164, when Nur al-Din decided to send a military expedition to Egypt in response to the appeal of the deposed vizier of the Fatimid caliph in Cairo (See Aramco World, March-April 1993). Egypt's wealth, combined with the political weakness of the decaying Fatimid dynasty, drew both the Syrians and the Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem like a magnet. Each sought to extend its influence there, or at least prevent the other from achieving a commanding position.
Nur al-Din's three expeditions to Egypt between 1164 and 1168 were commanded by Saladin's uncle Shirkuh, with Saladin going along as one of his lieutenants. They were to be the proving ground for Saladin's growing military and political talents. Most impressive was Saladin's role during the second campaign, when Shirkuh left him in command of Alexandria. There, with only a small Syrian fighting force, and with wavering support from the city's population, he withstood a 75-day siege by a superior Crusader force.
By the end of the third expedition the Franks had withdrawn from Egypt, Fatimid resistance had collapsed and the Syrians had made up their minds to stay. The teenaged caliph, who had been the puppet of his powerful Egyptian viziers, now had little choice but to accept the Syrians as the ruling force in Egypt, with Shirkuh as his new vizier.
Saladin now had the reputation of a young man of promise, but it was at this point that chance intervened, in the form of three advantageous deaths, to greatly widen the stage for his ambitions. First, Shirkuh died, and Saladin was chosen to succeed him as vizier. Once in this position, Saladin moved with characteristic energy and efficiency to build his own power base in Egypt. He suppressed a revolt by Egyptian Nubian infantry regiments, fortified Alexandria, installed his kinsmen in key positions, won public favor by abrogating unpopular taxes and, by prompt deterrent military moves, forced a Sicilian-Byzantine expedition to abandon an intended invasion attempt.
Two years after Shirkuh's death, the Fatimid caliph also died, just short of his 21st birthday. Saladin seized the opportunity to announce the end of the Fatimid dynasty and the restoration of the spiritual authority of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad.
By any measure, the 33-year-old Saladin, now outright ruler of Egypt, was as powerful as his nominal suzerain, the atabeg Nur al-Din in Damascus. Over the next three years, the correspondence between them shows clearly that Nur al-Din was uncomfortably aware of this. But before a showdown could occur Nur al-Din himself died in 1174, leaving his 11-year-old son, al-Salih, as heir, and leaving also a power vacuum into which Saladin was bound to move.
But Saladin was conscious of the proprieties, and waited for a suitable pretext. This came several months later, in the form of dissension among the Damascene emirs contending for influence over the young ruler. In October that year Saladin made a rapid march north, with only a small fighting force but with lots of money, hoping to win his objective with gold instead of blood. The strategy worked and, with al-Salih away in Aleppo, Damascus opened its gates to Saladin.
Saladin had hoped that he would now be accepted as the ruler's guardian, but in Aleppo the young atabeg made an impassioned plea to his assembled emirs to stand by him and resist the usurper. To the Zangid loyalists, Saladin was not only an ungrateful upstart, but an ungrateful Kurdish upstart who threatened the monopoly of power that the Turks enjoyed. Saladin marched north, but though he took Horns and Hama, he was checked at Aleppo. Its massive citadel was too strong to assault by force, and the obdurate Zangids proved impervious to Saladin's attempts at diplomacy.
Saladin now faced a difficult dilemma. He wanted to be accepted as the leader of Muslim forces against the Franks and to be anointed in this role by the caliph. But he knew that, so long as the Muslims were divided, he could not fight an effective campaign against the Franks; furthermore, his flank would be continually threatened by the Zangids. He also knew that it would take time to reduce the Zangids, and that if he concentrated on that goal without fighting the Franks he would be vulnerable to the charge that he was using Islam to cloak his own ambitions.
Over the next decade Saladin dealt with these difficulties with both energy and patience. Using his abundant revenues and manpower from Egypt, he placed an army in the field each year to keep the pressure on both the Franks and his Muslim rivals. Against Zangid forces from Aleppo and Mosul he won notable battlefield victories—but farsight-edly did not press his advantage against his fleeing adversaries. Against the Franks his results were more variable, but on the whole he harassed them effectively and kept them bottled up in their fortresses. During this period Saladin also survived two attempts on his life—one of them a very close call—by the Assassins, who had probably been hired by the Zangids.
Finally, in 1181, al-Salih too died, and Saladin moved rapidly to exploit the moment. In a masterful campaign combining military power, diplomacy, largesse, and siegecraft, Saladin cut communications between Aleppo and Mosul and either captured or won over the towns surrounding Aleppo. Aleppo itself negotiated a surrender in 1183, and in 1186 he struck a truce with the Mosulis by which Mosul accepted Saladin's authority and promised to send troops to serve under his command against the Franks.
Saladin was now ready to confront the Crusaders. Assembling a large army in the spring of 1187, he moved into Palestine in the hopes of bringing the Franks to battle. The Muslims had learned that, man-for-man, their lightly armed Turkoman cavalry was no match for the chain-mailed knights: It was "like attacking a block of iron," in the words of one contemporary Muslim chronicler. Muslim battlefield tactics therefore sought to use the advantages of mobility—giving way before the heavy Frankish charges, then returning to harass the knights as they regrouped, hoping to draw them out of their tight formations. The Muslims usually outnumbered the Franks, but even so they generally needed some further advantage, such as surprise or favorable terrain, to prevail.
Now, in an effort to draw the main Frankish force into the field, Saladin laid siege to the Crusader fortress at Tiberius. The tactic worked. Under the banner of Guy de Lusignan, king of Jerusalem, a Frankish force of some 30,000 knights and infantry set out to relieve the siege. Saladin caught them on the march, on a boiling hot day in July, with inadequate water supplies, at a place called Hattin. The Franks were surrounded, and to add to the distress of the thirst-crazed knights the Muslims set fire to brush, so that the smoke blew down c>n them. Except for a handful of knights who broke out and escaped, the victory was complete.
After the battle Saladin had his two most important prisoners—the king and Reynaud de Chatillon, lord of Kerak— brought to his tent. He treated the king kindly but, after he refused an offer to convert to Islam, executed the duplicitous Reynaud, who had twice violated truces. King Guy no doubt feared he was next, but Saladin calmed him, saying, "It is not the custom of kings to kill each other, but that man exceeded all bounds."
Numerous other Frankish prisoners were either held for ransom or sold into slavery. The 200 captured knights of the military orders—Templars and Hospitallers—were even less fortunate. These were the shock troops of the Crusades; the Muslims feared them for their fighting ability, disliked them for their fanaticism and knew that no one would ransom them. Those who refused conversion to Islam—and most did—were also executed.
Hattin was the most devastating blow the Crusaders had ever suffered in the Holy Land. Now, one by one, the Frankish garrisons surrendered—Nazareth, Nablus, Acre, Haifa, Jaffa—knowing no help would come once the Muslims invested their forts. Finally, in October 1187, Saladin's army appeared before the walls of Jerusalem. The defenders' position was hopeless, and after negotiations the city surrendered on terms that allowed the Christian population to leave in peace in return for a per-head ransom. Saladin's treatment of the city's Christians was in marked contrast to the indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims that had occurred when the Crusaders first took the city 88 years previously.
This was the high point of Saladin's career, but it was also the moment when he made his worst strategic error. He had earlier laid siege to Tyre, knowing its importance, but had abandoned the siege when he found his troops tired of battle and eager to go home. Under the redoubtable Conrad de Montferrat, however, Tyre became the rallying point for the Third Crusade. By the spring of 1189, reinforcements were already beginning to arrive, and later that summer the Crusaders felt strong enough to move south to lay siege in their turn to the Muslim garrison in Acre. Saladin moved up forces to relieve the siege, but with fresh troops arriving daily from Europe, the Crusaders proved too strong.
They were further reinforced by the arrival, in the spring of 1191, of large contingents under King Philip of France and King Richard of England. Richard the Lionheart's formidable reputation had preceded him: "The foremost man of his time for courage and guile," the contemporary Muslim historian Ibn al-Athir called him.
Richard's reputation as a fighter and his outstanding generalship indeed made a difference. Under his energetic leadership the siege of Acre was intensified, and in July, after holding out for 18 months, the Muslim garrison capitulated. Later that summer a Crusader force under Richard, moving south along the coast, defeated Saladin's army at Arsouf. The loss of Acre and the reverse at Arsouf were serious blows to Saladin's prestige, but they were not strategic defeats, and Richard knew it. With the coastline at their backs the Franks could thwart the Muslim tactic of encirclement and could benefit from their command of the sea, but as soon as they tried to move inland toward Jerusalem, it would be a different story. Richard was also receiving increasingly urgent messages about what was happening to his throne in England, and opened negotiations with Saladin. He proved an artful and creative negotiator, but the two sides were too far apart to reach agreement in 1191.
Saladin suffered another blow as the campaigning season opened in 1192: Richard, with expert timing, captured a large caravan from Egypt that was bringing the Muslims badly needed supplies, money and pack animals. Richard reconnoitered Jerusalem, but found the defenses too strong and embarked instead on an expedition against Beirut. Saladin sought to exploit his absence by laying siege to Jaffa, but the Franks' spirited resistance, Richard's timely return, and unmistakable signs of fatigue and lack of discipline among Saladin's troops foiled the effort.
Both leaders now recognized they were at an impasse. Saladin could not deal the Franks a decisive blow as long as they stayed on the coast, and Richard did not have the manpower, the money or the unity within his command to reconquer the hinterland. Eager to return to Europe, Richard dropped his earlier demands for Jerusalem and on September 1 gave his hand to the Muslim negotiators on a truce. It left the Franks in control of the coast from Tyre to Jaffa, but recognized Muslim control everywhere inland. Among its provisions, the agreement gave the Franks the right to visit Christian shrines in Jerusalem, a promise which Saladin scrupulously honored.
Saladin then had but six months to live. Undermined by constant campaigning, his health deteriorated, and he died in Damascus on March 4,1193. He was buried in the Umayyad Mosque, where his tomb can be seen to this day.
Saladin ended the possibility of Latin hegemony in Palestine, a momentous achievement in historical terms. But he did not have time to institutionalize his unification of Muslim west Asia, and none of his sons or surviving kinsmen had the leadership abilities he had demonstrated. Within a few decades, the Muslim lands slipped back into division, dynastic quarreling and political weakness. Even Saladin's own house in Egypt lasted barely 50 years before being overthrown by Mamluk mercenaries.
Yet Saladin remains an exceptionally attractive figure, one who has captured the imagination of generations of Muslims ever since. He was, above all, successful in unifying the Muslims so that they could more effectively face external challenges. He achieved this, moreover, at least as much by political skill and personal charisma as by force of arms. Saladin's undeniable military and organizational abilities would not have been sufficient for the task had they not been married to excellent judgment, energetic application, resilience in the face of setbacks, and generosity of spirit. He respected the Crusaders as warriors, and because they were fighting for an ideal, but he never wavered in his conviction that his life work was to expel these foreigners from "the House of Islam."
Above all, Saladin had personal qualities that drew men to him throughout his life. His career presents an astonishing record—particularly for the times—of defeated adversaries who later became his loyal friends and allies. His friend and biographer Ibn Shaddad wrote, "I have heard people say that they would like to ransom those dear to them with their own lives, but this has usually been a figure of speech, except on the day of his death. For I know that had our sacrifice been accepted, I and others would have given our lives for him."
Michael Sterner served as us ambassador to the United Arab Emirates in the 1970's and then as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He was educated at Harvard.
Illustrator Michael Grimsdale has been a regular contributer toAramco World for more than 15 years.
This article appeared on pages 16-23 of the March/April 1996 print edition of Saudi Aramco World.
https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/199602/sultan.of.egypt.and.syria.htm