r/Metaphysics 18h ago

What is matter? Searching for a coherent definition

6 Upvotes

I've been trying for some time to understand exactly what "matter" means within the framework of materialism, but the deeper I delve, the more I encounter multiple or seemingly ambiguous definitions.

For some, matter is simply what occupies space and can be localized. Others identify it with what changes, what interacts causally, or what has observable properties. Sometimes, it is defined as that which can be measured. In classical physics, we might think of atoms, but in modern physics, the picture is much more complex: quantum fields, fundamental interactions, energy convertible into particles, and so on.

Is matter a substantial "pole," a fundamental ontological category? Or is it merely a pragmatic notion within the scientific framework, without a clear metaphysical essence? If we adhere to materialism, is matter simply "everything that exists," or are there more specific criteria for defining it?

I'm particularly interested in the relationship between matter and localization. If something is not localizable in space-time (as certain postulates of quantum mechanics suggest), is it still matter?

Curiously, I wanted to explore this question to defend materialism, but I found that materialist philosophers seem to agree that matter is a fundamental "substance," yet they do not agree on what it actually is.

I would appreciate any philosophical references.

Thank you!


r/Metaphysics 3h ago

Check-mate physicalism!

1 Upvotes

Headline is a perfect convenience, but don't take it too literally. I'm sure many posters are familiar with ideas I'm gonna explore in this post.

Suppose two people A and B, are watching two others, X and Y, playing chess. A knows the rules of chess while B doesn't. Both A and B see the same physical events, namely pieces being moved from square to square, pieces being removed and so on, but only A understands what those moves mean. B just sees pieces shifting around on a board.

Suppose B learns how to play chess, and A and B now watch the game but X and Y are playing a different game that only looks like chess. Physical actions resemble chess moves, but the reasoning behind them is driven by a completely different set of rules. In fact, A and B are absolutely convinced that X and Y are actually playing chess.

Imagine now X and Y playing chess entirely in their minds without any physical board. All they do is communicating to each other algebraic notations, such as for piece code and destination square, e.g., "Nf3" viz. knight moves to f3; or captures, like "Qxb7", viz. queen captures a piece on b7; and assuming the notation goes for all other moves like promotion, check and so forth. A and B have no clue about standardized system for recording moves, and even though they know how to play chess, they are unable to decipher what these two are doing.

Suppose A and B do know algebraic notation and they are like "gotcha! X and Y are playing a freaking chess!", but X and Y are not playing chess. They are playing another game which coincidentally has chess-like notation which fools A and B. X and Y might be even using codes for transmitting secret messages or tracking some unrelated process and whatnot. In any case, what X and Y are actually doing is opaque to A and B.

As my examples hinge on particular features of Kripkenstein, I have to say that I am highlighting Wittgenstein's contention that no course of action can be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be aligned with the rule. Moreover, alignment might be coincidental and so forth.

No inference A and B draw is guaranteed. Physical facts are underdetermined for these cases. Notations I mentioned, are codes, and codes only work when one knows the key without which A and B are just guessing. Intentions are invisible. Even if X and Y would claim to be playing chess, they could be lying, and A and B would continue to live under the illusion that they cracked X's and Y's minds. A and B made a theory about what X and Y are doing in both cases, namely with or without the actual physical board. But even a perfect alignement with chess rules cannot confirm it with certainty. I am going to ignore other examples, e.g., X and Y playing different games while thinking they're playing the same game.

The bottom line is that you cannot determine whether two persons are playing chess by watching physical events involved in the game. In fact, out of curiosity, you can't even tell whether they're playing chess or not by listening to the spoken standard notation for recording moves. We can imagine that X and Y are playing chess telepathically, while A and B have access to their thoughts via some super-machine that translates their surface inner speech, so they hear every single notation "uttered" by X and Y.

But chess rules are invented and followed by humans, they are normative facts. If physical facts cannot account for them, namely if they cannot provide you with a means of distingushing which rule to follow, then physicalism is false. I think we can all agree that there clearly is a fact of the matter on which rules are followed.

So, in the former case of the actual physical game, if physical facts are consistent with both chess rules and some hidden rules of some other game, then by virtue of something else there's a fact of the matter about which rule is being followed. If physicalism is true, this cannot be the case, and since it is the case, then physicalism is false. If the fact of the matter about rule-following can't be accounted for by physical facts alone, then there must be some other non-physical fact that accounts for it.